Drawing on psychological research, philosophers have recently argued for a variety of theories of the nature of character that aim to provide an empirical framework for virtue ethics (Kamtekar, 2004; Merritt, 2009; Russell, 2009; Snow, 2010; Webber, 2006) . The idea of valuing is involved in different ways in these different accounts, but none of these accounts draws explicitly on empirical research focusing on the psychology of value, even though the psychological commitments of virtue ethics are central to its philosophical programme.

This project is examining the importance of recent psychological evidence for effects of prior value instantiation on contemporary philosophical discussions of virtue within ethics. Philosophical methods of critical reflection are being applied to the results of past psychological research and the emerging results of the other ViA research projects. Our application of these methods focuses on the philosophical and normative implications of the influence that prior value instantiation has on subsequent applications of value. Does the past evidence for such effects show that non-deliberative, automatic responses to situations must fall significantly short of the stability and rationality that virtue seems to require (i.e., according to virtue ethicists)? Can values be strengthened sufficiently to preclude such effects? If so, how best are values developed and embedded? To what extent was Aristotle right to emphasise practical habituation (which intrinsically involves repeated value instantiations) as essential to the cultivation of virtue? Throughout the discussions of these issues, we consider the relevance of the conclusions to the practical question of addressing moral concerns in public discussion and public policy on contemporary issues (e.g., climate change, crime prevention.